Due to structural constraints, agencies are encouraged to spend all of their funding by the end of the fiscal year, resulting in large expenditures during the final quarter.However, in defense agencies these pathologies may be overridden by impending strategic concerns on the battlefield during times of war./* Load GPT asynchronously */var googletag = googletag
The literature on diversionary war thus far is plagued by methodological and theoretical problems that contribute to the diversity of findings on how leaders use conflict to stay in power.
Principle among these theoretical shortcomings is a lack of attention to the institutional differences between democratic countries and autocratic states that lead to varying predictions about the frequency and timing of diversionary conflict, and the incentives of leaders to maintain power and direct public attention away from domestic instability.
The third and fourth empirical chapters evaluate systematic deviations and patterns in bombing operations over North and South Vietnam using a recently released dataset that enables analysis of bombing runs from 1965 to 1975.
Finally, I conclude with a comparative case study of the strategic bombing campaigns as executed by the United States and United Kingdom during World War II.
Her work evaluates how elections alter the incentives of democratic leaders during conflict, changes to battlefield strategies in the month leading up to an election as politicians attempt to reduce casualties.These findings challenge current theories of alliance formation, and clarify the mechanisms through which democratic accountability influence policy-makers in foreign policy.This paper assesses the role that democratic institutions on diversionary conflict.Her Ph D dissertation (upon which her book manuscript is based) was awarded first runner-up for the 2015 Kenneth Waltz Prize from the American Political Science Association, an award that recognizes the best dissertation written in security studies in a calendar year. in political science from Stanford University in 2015, and a S. I argue that military operations on the battlefield are systematically influenced by civilian politicians to favor lower-risk strategies in the months preceding a domestic election.She remains an adjunct political scientist for RAND, where she works on hypersonic missile technology and nonproliferation issues. Because domestic constituencies are casualty-sensitive, democratically elected civilians face strong incentives to temporarily trade long-term strategic success for a short-term decrease in casualties, resulting in the direct and indirect politicization of military operations.I test this by first presenting evidence that shows considerable temporal variation in alliance formation amongst democracies, and then by utilizing a new dataset that tracks the electoral calendar of every state in the modern era.Results indicate that democracies are much less likely to enter into alliances in response to new security threats as domestic elections draw nearer and public opinion becomes increasingly important.The precipitous drop in violence in Iraq beginning in late 2006 has confounded scholars and policy-makers alike, resulting in a large literature on counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics.This paper offers a reinterpretation of a crucial case in the counterinsurgency literature – the pacification of Tal Afar – and utilizes a new dataset documenting the location and concentration of U. forces in Iraq from 2004 to 2008 to test an important piece of early scholarship in the Iraq debate. The presence of this kinetic “wet blanket” on violence presents an alternative theory to studies that emphasize population-centric counterinsurgency strategies, and suggests that it is the projection of coercive power, rather than population-sensitive tactics, that quells violence in counterinsurgency campaigns.I argue that because democratic transitions are peaceful and legislatures and a free press provide institutional checks on the abuse of power, we are significantly less likely to observe incidences of diversionary war as politicians compete for reelection and transition out of office.Further, because regular elections limit the time period during which the executive is concerned about public opinion to the months immediately before a general election, we should be most likely to see diversionary conflict during these electoral moments.